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Abstract 
The study that this article is based on examined cases of alleged misconduct involving chief 
police officers and staff. It described the nature of cases that came to light, examined 
pathways that lead to misconduct, and suggested ways of mitigating risks. The study was 
based on interviews with key stakeholders and with investigating officers in chief officer 
misconduct cases since April 2008.  Cases involving chief officer misconduct fell into two 
broad categories: those associated with professional decision-making, and those related to 
interpersonal conduct. In around a third of cases, no misconduct was found. There were 
various routes into misconduct. The ethical climate of a police force was a key determinant of 
chief officer misconduct. Behaviour was also shaped by individual vulnerabilities, including 
lack of support, lack of challenge, exposure to corrupting influences, and cognitive failures in 
decision-making. Various things can be done to mitigate the risk of chief officer misconduct: 
police leadership needs to develop a greater consensus on what constitutes misconduct; Chief 
Officers need to recognise the specific risks of cognitive failure that organisational leaders 
face, and the temptations of excepting themselves from rules and norms. There also needs to 
be an organisational ethos in which leaders can be challenged, and in which leaders are given 
the right sort of support when faced with ethical challenges. There needs to be more 
recognition of the impact of selection and training processes, and of performance 
management systems, on the ethical climate of police organisations. 
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Introduction 
Police decision-making very often involves ethical considerations, whether explicitly or 
implicitly. From its inception, policing has always been vulnerable to corruption, unethical 
behaviour and the glare of public scrutiny when things go wrong. In the case of England and 
Wales, every recent decade over the last 50 years has seen scandals which have resulted in 
inquiries and reforms. Until recently however, it has been rare for these scandals to touch the 
highest echelons of policing. In 2012, Sean Price of Cleveland Constabulary became the first 
chief constable to be sacked since Stanley Parr in 1977, having been found guilty of gross 
misconduct. 
This paper uses the term ‘misconduct’ in its broadest sense, encompassing criminal 
behaviours but also those that do not meet the criminal threshold but are nevertheless in 
breach of formal regulations or in some sense unethical. As will emerge in our discussion of 
findings, there is no clear consensus with the police service about the boundaries of 
misconduct – beyond the rather circular definition that misconduct is behaviour which is 
judged to be so in investigations of misconduct.   
 
The last decade has seen a growing number of investigations into the conduct of chief 
officers1, touching on, for example, allegations of unjustified expenses, interfering with 
recruitment processes, unethical commercial decisions and relationships with the media, 
bullying and sexual harassment, professional malpractice, and even allegations of criminal 
conspiracy. Chief officers in England and Wales have been reprimanded, suspended, sacked 
and resigned – but also in a number of cases cleared of all suspicion. Two chief officers have 
committed suicide whilst being investigated. As at early-2015, over 40 cases of alleged chief 
officer misconduct since the early 2000s could be found in open source reporting, most 
relating to investigations since the start of 2008. 
 
All of this has taken place in the context of renewed and vigorous scrutiny of the ethics of 
policing, particularly following the Leveson Inquiry (2012), the ‘Plebgate’ affair, the report of 
the Hillsborough Independent Panel (2012), and revelations about the undercover policing of 
domestic protest groups and the collection of information on bereaved families including the 
family of Stephen Lawrence (see, for example, Ellison (2014) and Creedon (2013; 2014a and 
b)). In 2013, the Home Affairs Select Committee published a report on leadership and 
standards in the police, and called for a new police code of ethics and integrity in England and 
Wales (HASC, 2013). A Code of Ethics for policing was subsequently published by the College 
of Policing (2014), and laid as a code of practice by Parliament in July 2014. 
4 
 
Against this background, the College of Policing decided to commission research into chief 
officer misconduct, and the authors of this paper formed the team that were contracted to do 
the work (Hales et al., 2015). The study is exploratory, examining a highly complex set of 
issues around misconduct. It presents interviewees’ perceptions of misconduct, as such we 
have drawn on the insights of people who were well-placed to speak on the issues. Thus, the 
research provides a qualitative snapshot of the majority of chief officer misconduct cases that 
came to light in England and Wales since 2008. 
Research aims and methods 
The project had four main aims: 
1. To describe the nature of misconduct cases involving chief officers.  
2. To explore the context in which the alleged unethical behaviour took place. 
3. To identify the factors that may have contributed to those acts of wrongdoing. 
4. To consider how best to mitigate the risks of misconduct. 
The study relied on interviews with two main groups of respondent: key stakeholders – 
people, mainly senior police officers, who were well-placed by virtue of their professional 
experience to talk about misconduct at chief officer level; and investigators – with direct 
experience of being involved in chief officer investigations. We interviewed 11 key 
stakeholders, 3 of whom had investigated chief officers, and a further 23 investigators. The 
interviews covered 40 cases over a period of eight years relating to 33 chief police officers 
and equivalent police staff.  These cases involved only a small minority of chief officers over 
the time period in question. Those who were interviewed were able to recall and discuss the 
detail of specific cases, and had well-developed perspectives on issues of chief officer 
misconduct. The sample of stakeholders was identified by College of Policing staff and from 
our own knowledge of the field. Most of the interviews were carried out in 2014. Interviews 
were semi-structured and typically involved one or two researchers interviewing a single 
interview subject. Interviews were recorded and professionally transcribed, and then analysed 
by the research team using NVIVO 9. A number of measures were taken to ensure the 
confidentiality of research participants and the cases they discussed, including the use of 
encrypted storage devices. We considered interviewing people who were the subject of 
misconduct investigations, though we had misgivings about the reliability of such data, and 
the risks of getting drawn into discussions about culpability. In any case, however, the 
practicalities involved in brokering access meant that this was not feasible within the 
timescales of the study. We also considered extracting data from case files, but again access 
would have been problematic, and we would have also needed help from investigators in 
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taking us through the files, so this option was not pursued.  A fuller account of the study’s 
methods can be found in Hales et al. (2015). 
 
Research on misconduct 
Most misconduct involves police officers and staff from the more junior and more populous 
ranks. However, police leaders at chief officer level set the tone for their organisations and 
wider public perceptions, and are understandably held to a higher standard. Research on the 
topic of misconduct by police leaders is limited. However, there is an extensive body of 
literature on police misconduct and corruption amongst rank-and-file officers (see Newburn, 
1999, for a review), and on organisational conduct more generally (which tends to focus on 
leaders – see Treviño et al. 2014 for a review). 
The latter body of literature is probably more relevant to our topic than the former. Whilst 
misconduct among chief officers shares some things in common with unethical behaviour 
among frontline officers, in some important ways chief officer misconduct is distinctively 
different: they are highly visible, exposed to multiple systems of accountability, and 
responsible for maintaining the reputation of their force; they carry a heavy burden of 
responsibility for ensuring the effectiveness and integrity of police work; and the nature of 
their role can also prove isolating, with limited preparation for the role, and a lack of both 
support and constructive challenge.  
 
Cognitive vs volitional failure? 
Work originating in Kahnemann and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory has found that the 
form of ‘decision frames’ that are available to decision-makers can affect ethical behaviour 
(cf. Kern and Chugh 2009; Greenbaum et al. 2012). Greenbaum and colleagues suggested 
that in some organisations decisions are framed within a ‘bottom-line mentality’ that involves 
“one-dimensional thinking that revolves around securing bottom-line outcomes to the neglect 
of competing priorities” (2012: 334). The ‘bottom-line mentality’ decision frame tends to 
exclude ethical considerations in decision-making. While the police service has no commercial 
objectives, there is an obvious equivalent to the ‘bottom-line mentality’ frame within policing 
in the form of an over-focus on quantitative crime reduction targets, as discussed in a Public 
Administration Select Committee (2014) report on crime statistics. Pressures to account for 
performance can distort judgement. 
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A more nuanced explanation that addresses the range of competing priorities confronting 
organisations can be found in Price’s (2006) analysis, which is of particular relevance to this 
study given its focus on ethical failures of leadership. Price located the roots of misconduct in 
processes of cognition. He argued that misconduct by leaders was understood better as 
‘cognitive failure’ than as ‘volitional failure’ – a failure of reasoning rather than a failure of 
motive. The volitional account is that leaders place their self-interest above ethical standards 
in the full knowledge that they are wrong to do so. They knowingly do wrong, and plan to get 
away with it.  The cognitive account, by contrast, proposes that there are characteristic 
cognitive failures made by leaders which lead them to except themselves from the ethical 
standards that apply to the rest of their organisation.  
Price suggests that it is the unique position of leaders in organisations that creates the risk of 
this sort of cognitive failure. That is, leaders fail to see that ethical – or even legal – 
standards apply to themselves as much as they do to those they lead. They may do things 
that are judged to be ethically wrong without appreciating that their behaviour is problematic. 
The pressures that create this form of cognitive failure are to do with leaders’ sense of the 
particular importance of the collective task that their organisation is pursuing, and their role 
in ensuring that the tasks are achieved. 
Leaders advance the interests of their organisation – or the goals being pursued by their 
organisation – and in so doing earn an entitlement to special rewards. For the most part, 
leaders’ self-interest sits in comfortable alignment with the goals of the organisation. Leaders’ 
perception of their special position, however, can place them at risk of making exceptions of 
themselves and excusing themselves from general ethical standards. 
According to Price’s cognitive account, leaders will typically not ‘get it’ – or will fail to grasp 
the nature of their ethical failure – when confronted with accusations of misconduct, because 
they will think that they were entitled, as leaders, to do the actions under contention. As will 
emerge, in our study this proved to be a consistent tendency across different categories of 
misconduct, and is not specific to cases involving pay, perks, allowances and expenses. 
Some support for this perspective can be found in the common patterns of misconduct among 
leaders from a range of different sorts of organisation. Leaders, almost by definition, are 
entitled to a larger than average share of the rewards that organisations offer their staff. 
Arguably, the special entitlement of leaders is actually a way of signifying, and thus 
consolidating, their authority. The risk that this situation creates, however, is behaviour that 
reflects a sense of over-entitlement. Against this perspective, the scandals associated with 
leaders – whether in politics, business, or in large state bureaucracies such as the police, the 
7 
 
military and the health service – tend to exhibit the theme of over-entitlement. During times 
of austerity, the ‘public mood’ (at least as reflected through, or created by, the media) is 
especially sensitive to cases where organisational leaders exceed their entitlement to 
organisational rewards. It should be stressed, however, that ethical failure in leadership can 
run far beyond issues of remuneration, and the common factor is the sense of entitlement to 
except oneself from the organisation’s general rules and ethical standards. 
Ethical climates within police organisations 
Research on police misconduct has tended to focus on behaviour by front-line officers that is 
simultaneously illegal, against police regulations, and unethical. Of course, much misconduct 
is legal, breaching no criminal laws, and some unethical behaviour is not even covered by 
police regulations. The point here is that standards of ethical behaviour in policing cover 
rather more extensive terrain than police regulations and the criminal law; the terrain that is 
not covered by formal rules and regulations is governed largely by shared norms and 
standards – which flow from the ethical climate of the organisation. This issue raises 
important questions about the ‘drivers’ of the ethical climate in policing organisations. 
Drawing on the wider research into misconduct, Figure 1 aims to summarise how 
organisational processes and structures might interact to shape the ethical climate in any 
given police force, which in turn shapes patterns of misconduct. 
 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Figure 1 proposes that the ethical climate of an organisation is shaped by a number of 
organisational processes (the dark oblongs on the left). Formal codes of conduct and rules are 
an obvious and important shaping factor; so too are selection and training procedures, which 
determine the sort of people in the organisation, and how they go about their work. The 
systems for performance management and reward are likely to have a significant impact, as 
they embody and signify the organisation’s values and culture. Finally the style of leadership 
can (but may not always have) a profound effect on the ethical climate. 
The figure suggests that an organisation’s ethical climate shapes individuals’ ethical decision-
making (the dark ovals on the right of the figure), but that this process is mediated by 
situational factors such as:  
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 Individual differences between decision-makers.  
 The decision frames that have currency within the organisation.  
 The presence or absence of ethical challenge and ethical support.  
 The presence or absence of ‘corrupting’ colleagues. 
On the far right-hand side of the figure, we have suggested that after an initial ethical failure, 
there is a dynamic process by which decision-makers can ‘learn’ from their experience in 
terms of whether misconduct ‘works’ for them, which may depend on whether and how their 
initial behaviour is challenged. This step in the model is an attempt to reflect the fact that 
some misconduct is not a ‘one-off’ lapse, and that patterns of unethical behaviour can 
develop over the course of a career if not challenged early on. 
Figure 1 is a schematic device to show the sorts of factors which need to be taken into 
account when examining misconduct at any level in police organisations. An account of the 
pressures to engage in misconduct that ignores these organisational and situational factors is 
likely to be partial and incomplete. However, the picture becomes more complicated when it 
comes to misconduct at chief officer level, as chief officers can exercise a degree of control 
over the organisational factors that generate the ethical climate of their organisation. 
However, this control is usually constrained – chief officers’ decisions may both shape, and be 
shaped by, their organisation.  
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Trends in chief officer misconduct 
This study did not set out to examine trends in chief officer misconduct, and we 
have not gathered any data that would enable any firm conclusions to be 
reached as to whether misconduct is getting more or less prevalent. However, it 
was clearly an issue that arose in the course of the interviews, and something 
needs to be said on the topic. It is clear that many misconduct cases involving 
chief officers have surfaced over the last ten years after a long period when very 
few cases were reported. Our trawl of open source material located over 40 
cases, the majority of which related to investigations that took place in 2008 or 
later. Lack of evidence means that we must sidestep the question as to whether 
the emergence of this volume of cases reflects falling standards or increased 
scrutiny. Before the introduction of PACE2, when the police were effectively a 
closed institution, abuse of due process and corruption were widespread in some 
forces and in some squads. It also seems likely that misconduct stretched across 
the range of ranks. It is harder to say much about more recent trends. Several 
of the cases that have recently come to light are historic, while others are more 
recent. In aggregate, the recent cases – and their reporting by the media – may 
create an impression among the public of an ‘institution in crisis’ that is facing 
growing ethical challenges. Some of our interviewees talked in terms of there 
being an ‘ethical crisis’ in policing. If this is the case, some of the causal factors 
may be found in the global financial crisis of 2008 and in the period of austerity 
that has followed. Chief officers’ roles have certainly become more challenging 
since 2008, as they have had to introduce significant budget cuts and ‘do more 
with less’.  This may have created pressures to cut corners in decision making, 
including those decisions with an ethical component. However, a large proportion 
of interviewees also suggested that scrutiny of the police was intensifying, and 
that the ethical climate in policing was actually changing for the better. Possible 
factors underlying more intensive scrutiny include the scandal relating to 
expenses for Members of Parliament that emerged in 2009, and an associated 
sensitivity in the mass media to stories about ‘fat cats’, whether in industry or 
heading public services, whose belts were not being tightened as austerity took 
its toll on the general public. 
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A typology of chief officer misconduct 
As discussed above, this paper uses the term ‘misconduct’ in its broadest sense, 
encompassing criminal behaviours but also those that do not meet the criminal 
threshold but are nevertheless in breach of formal regulations or in some sense 
unethical. Organisationally, police forces tend to deal somewhat separately (in 
ascending order of seriousness) with:  
 Grievances (i.e. workplace relations, management style and decisions). 
 Professional standards (i.e. breaches of police regulations). 
 Anti-corruption (i.e. criminal conduct). 
In practice, however, it is clear that the boundaries are significantly blurred, and 
individual cases may cross into different categories. 
In general, research on police misconduct has been concerned primarily with the 
‘rank and file’, especially in public-facing and patrol environments. These 
environments are not especially relevant at the chief officer level. There are 
potentially fewer opportunities at this level for the classic forms of ‘corruption’ 
involving the perversion of due process (whether for personal gain or for ‘noble 
cause’ motives), abuse of suspects’ rights or the soliciting of bribes.  
At the same time, chief officers operate in a distinctive environment that 
presents considerable risks, pressures and temptations, including: 
 The ‘temptations of the powerful’. 
 Isolation and a lack of challenge. 
 A lack of personal support. 
 Being under tremendous scrutiny and, at the same time, paradoxically, 
under very little scrutiny.  
 A greater emphasis on non-law enforcement professional managerial 
responsibilities (e.g. HR, finance, commissioning and procurement). 
There are two broad narratives for understanding chief officer misconduct that 
echo the academic analysis of frontline staff. The first focuses on structural risks 
and vulnerabilities relating to the nature of the professional task, selection and 
promotion processes, barriers to challenging misconduct, and weak 
11 
 
accountability mechanisms and other processes. The second focuses on 
individual risks and vulnerabilities, including the impact of seniority on decision-
making. The typology below draws both on the analysis of our interview material 
and on the open source material.  
Misconduct associated with professional decision-making 
 Abuses of due process and other forms of misrepresentation, suppression 
of information and dishonesty 
 Abuses of force procedures relating to recruitment and procurement 
 Material/financial misconduct, associated with pay, perks, hospitality, 
travel and expenses 
 Other forms of professional misjudgement (e.g. mis-authorisation of 
police powers, disclosure of confidential information, email communication 
and use of social media) 
Misconduct associated with interpersonal conduct 
 Bullying 
 Prejudice and discrimination (e.g. racism, sexism) 
 Sexual misconduct (e.g. lewd remarks, sexually inappropriate behaviour) 
Unfounded / vexatious allegations 
 
The point about separating these types of misconduct – while acknowledging 
inevitable overlaps – is this:  interpersonal misconduct may exist on its own but 
not otherwise relate to the substance of professional practice (e.g. strategic or 
operational decision-making); and someone can commit misconduct while 
discharging their management responsibilities, without compromising their 
standards of personal conduct. A specific category of unfounded and/or 
vexatious allegations has been included in the typology to reflect the complete   
profile of misconduct allegations received  by chief officers , even when 
ultimately they are found to be without merit.  
A summary of the 40 allegations against the 33 chief officers in our sample is 
presented in Table 1 and uses this typology to describe the alleged misconduct 
involved in each case, the rank of the officer investigated, and the outcome of 
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the investigation (where known).  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
Routes into chief officer misconduct 
We found that the perspective of previous research on misconduct formed a 
good fit with the cases that our interviewees told us about. Implicit – and 
sometimes explicit – in their accounts was the interplay between structural risk 
factors relating to the organisation’s ethical climate and more specific individual 
risk factors.  
Structural risk factors 
Three deeply inter-woven themes emerged as especially significant:  
 political-cultural factors that shape organisational values;  
 career progression processes; and  
 a lack of challenge when misconduct is evident.  
Reference to cultural values frequently emerged in interviews. Interviewees 
described how targets associated with crime and its detection had engendered a 
narrow emphasis on crime performance as the basis for evaluating professional 
ability and that this narrowly instrumental ‘bottom-line mentality’ had eroded 
public service values. We were told that some chief officers tended to see 
themselves as being more akin to ‘captains of industry’ than public servants – 
with all the entitlements and privileges that came with the CEO role. Several 
interviewees described a ‘culture of entitlement’ at chief officer level. It also 
appeared that in some areas, local governance bodies had themselves at times 
been complicit in fostering this culture.  
If the idea of corrosion of previously more robust public values suggests a 
decline in standards, an equally common theme was that the culture of some 
forces had simply failed to keep up with improvements in ethical standards. A 
culture of entitlement among some leaders had become ingrained to an extent 
that rendered it impervious to the changing ethical landscape associated with 
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‘austerity’.  
Some interviewees suggested that policing has fundamentally lacked ethical 
values, offering various explanations. One was that the legalistic training of 
officers upon recruitment and the managerial pressures on middle and senior 
officers left little room for ethical considerations. Another was that policing 
‘doesn’t value difference’, and that officers felt under pressure throughout their 
careers not to ‘step outside the mould’. A third was that there were values, but 
the ‘wrong kinds’ of values that stemmed historically from a command-and-
control style of management and the toleration of bullying within a ‘boys’ club’ 
culture. 
Career progression processes were often identified as contributing to 
misconduct. These processes were seen as highly competitive at senior level, 
creating both a narrow focus amongst candidates on ‘gaming’ the processes and 
– in those who succeeded – a sense of exceptional achievement and, thus, 
entitlement. Several interviewees described how the Strategic Command Course 
tended to create close mutually supportive and inward-looking networks. The 
training was thought to be light on ethical issues and on questions of values. It 
was also suggested that chief officers tended to select and appoint people ‘in 
their own image’, thus reproducing the ethical climate prevailing among police 
leaders. Some interviewees regarded high potential (accelerated promotion) 
schemes as sources of risk, suggesting that these officers gathered breadth of 
experience but not the depth of experience needed to develop robust ethical 
standards. 
The final structural factor that emerged was the lack of challenge inbuilt into 
police culture. Challenging more senior ranks was widely considered to be 
career-limiting. In addition, several interviewees referred to an organisational 
failure to challenge misconduct at earlier stages of people’s careers, and indeed 
a preparedness to ignore or tolerate misconduct either when selecting people for 
chief officer rank or when providing references on candidates. It was also 
suggested that integrity vetting (which has different levels of intrusiveness) 
could be inadequate. 
Other organisational vulnerabilities were also identified, which related to 
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organisational structures and processes. The main ones were as follows: 
 The nature and demands of the chief officer role.  
 Weaknesses and changes in governance arrangements.  
 Weak internal processes.  
 Issues relating to procurement processes. 
 
Individual level risk factors 
If features of the organisation provide the backdrop against which people make 
decisions that result in misconduct, individual factors are also of obvious 
importance for shaping conduct. Individual vulnerabilities include absence of 
ethical or emotional support, lack of challenge, exposure to corrupting 
influences, and cognitive failures in decision-making. As discussed above, 
research unrelated to policing has suggested that leaders are prone to particular 
forms of cognitive failure – in failing to recognise that excepting themselves from 
organisational standards and requirements is ethically problematic. In our 
interviews, cognitive failure was much more evident than volitional failure, which 
might help explain how people get to the highest levels of police leadership, yet 
show a lack of integrity. There was a consensus among our interviewees that 
only a very small number of chief officers who have been involved in misconduct 
have done so for personal gain. 
Where chief officers appeared not to be motivated by personal gain –  and this 
applies to more cases in our sample – one of two issues was evident. First, some 
chief officers who were found to have committed misconduct were reported to 
have disputed their behaviour constituted misconduct at all. Second, we were 
told of cases of exceptionalism, in that chief officers seemed to have understood 
the rules, but felt they did not apply in their particular case.  
In a number of cases there were individual vulnerabilities that appeared to be 
relevant to their behaviour. Interviewees identified various individual 
weaknesses that they regarded as risk factors. Some suggested that arrogance 
is a corollary of decisiveness, which is considered a desirable and necessary 
attribute in chief officers. Lack of ability and incompetence were also mentioned 
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– especially in the context of austerity cuts that required generalist senior 
officers to undertake specialist functions for which they were poorly equipped, 
for example in procurement. A minority of cases in our sample hinged on 
relationship issues, including:  
 complaints made by spouses or partners at the point the relationship had 
failed; 
 claims for expenses incurred while officers conducted affairs; 
 relationships that had not been disclosed to vetting officers; and  
 inappropriate, and potentially predatory, sexual conduct towards junior 
colleagues.  
Several cases illustrated the risks associated with chief officers approaching 
retirement and turning their attention to life after policing – involving improper 
use of time or resources while pursuing post-retirement job opportunities.  
 
Conclusions: responding to misconduct 
This paper has set out the findings of an exploratory study into chief officer 
misconduct. It is a qualitative piece of work, and we have relied heavily on the 
insights of those whom we interviewed. One of the key themes of the research is 
that one of the best ways of improving ethical standards within an organisation 
is to ensure that there is intelligent and open debate on the issues. This paper 
may help to ensure that debate of this sort takes place. 
 
We hope that we have identified processes and procedures that damage the 
ethical climate of police organisations, and those that can help promote high 
ethical standards. However, in research of this nature, conclusions can never be 
definitive. Ensuring that there is more of a consensus on ethical standards in 
policing, and on the values that the police service should espouse, is ultimately a 
task for police leaders themselves. 
 
While interviewees painted a rather bleak picture of the recent ethical health of 
some chief officers in some forces, it was clear that across chief officer ranks as 
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a whole the appetite was very much for change. Indeed, the very change 
interviewees spoke of had already started to embed itself among many chief 
officer teams around the country. Interviewees discussed the importance of 
policing with integrity and promoting strong and ethically intelligent leaders who 
value and encourage challenge, manage with integrity, and possess an ethical 
intelligence that imbues the chief officer team and, thus, the rest of the 
workforce. Shortly after the completion of this research, the College of Policing 
published a leadership review (College of Policing, 2015), many of the 
recommendations of which echo the proposals discussed in this section. 
Reshaping the ethical climate in police forces 
The future ethical climate needs to be consciously shaped not only by chief 
officers and staff but also by those that govern and provide oversight – the 
PCCs, the IPCC, the College of Policing, the Home Office and HMIC.A clear theme 
to emerge is that the ethical climate of a police force is seen as a very significant 
factor in shaping the behaviour of both chief officers and rank-and-file. Our 
interviewees were unanimous about the centrality of ethical leadership in 
shaping the ethical culture both of the senior command teams and their forces. 
Respondents were clear that the ethical direction and moral health checks of 
chief officers need to come from within. Interviewees were clear that chief 
officers need to set out a clear and simple expectation of how they will behave, 
how they will challenge their peers who do not meet the standards expected of 
their office, and how they will protect the integrity of both their own force and 
the wider police service. 
Several interviewees drew links between styles of leadership and models of 
performance management. The suggestion was that performance management 
systems that were overly mechanistic and narrowly instrumental would 
necessarily be in tension with some public service values. A number of 
interviewees believed that officers that adopt a commercial leadership model 
with narrowly defined goals will inevitably steer themselves into difficult moral 
territories. 
A consistent theme was that the ethical climate within the organisation was 
closely linked to the workforce’s experience of organisational justice (cf Colquitt 
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et al., 2008). The value of pursuing organisational justice within a force is that it 
can help support an ethical climate within which chief officers themselves are 
likely to be less at risk of misconduct. 
Selection and promotion 
Many interviewees highlighted that the identification and selection of chief 
officers lacked transparency and rigour. A recurring theme was the tendency to 
support candidates for promotion who were unlikely to challenge the leadership 
style or question the status quo. The selection process needs to ensure that the 
best candidates are selected rather than the hand-picked convenient candidate 
who stands as a mirror image of their current chief. 
Building a consensus on ethical standards 
One of the most important themes to emerge from this study is that there are 
significant divergences of view about the ethical standards that apply to chief 
officers, and about the gravity of different forms of misconduct. Some of those 
we interviewed felt that the system could sometimes respond disproportionately 
to chief officer misconduct. Others felt that police leaders as a group still had a 
long way to go in developing coherent ethical standards. The development and 
introduction of a Code of Ethics is clearly important, but there remains a 
significant challenge to ensure there is a consistent outlook among individual 
chief officers, the National Police Chiefs’ Council (the successor body to ACPO), 
College of Policing, PCCs, HMIC, the Home Office and the IPCC. In addition to a 
greater consistency in approach, chief officers need to actively promote and 
encourage a culture where ethics, integrity and values are at the heart of 
policing, not just within the chief officer team, but throughout the force.  
Protecting against cognitive failure 
One potential strategy for reducing the risk of this sort of cognitive failure would 
be to increase chief officers’ awareness of the risks, and to encourage them to 
be more explicit about when and why they have excepted themselves from any 
ethical rules. Exposing their thinking in this way might enable them to test 
whether the exception is justified or not. Senior managers clearly need to be 
more sensitive to the consequences of ethical misjudgements. There may be 
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scope for reshaping and broadening the dominant decision frames within which 
police leaders make decisions. On the issue of entitlement, many interviewees 
disclosed how the unethical reputations of some chief officers were common 
knowledge among their peers, but that these officers were left unchecked and 
unchallenged. Interviewees shared the opinion that offering protection to errant 
officers was a sign of weak internal governance. 
Support and challenge 
There are many practical things that can be done to mitigate the risks of chief 
officer misconduct. Chief officers need to ensure that they have access both to 
support in their decision-making and to constructive challenge, and barriers to 
challenge need to be addressed (for example, through whistle-blowing provisions 
which provide genuine safeguards to those who call attention to misconduct). 
Organisational change in any large institution can take time, and is likely to 
require its architects and champions. In the eyes of our interviewees, these 
architects and champions already exist at the chief officer level. 
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Endnotes 
                                       
1. This paper defines ‘chief officers’ as sworn police officers and civilian members 
of police staff holding a position of – or equivalent to – assistant chief constable 
(commander in the Metropolitan Police) and above. As at March 2014, there 
were 204 chief officers in England and Wales (Home Office 2014: Table A), down 
from 216 in 2012 (Home Office 2012: Table A) and 223 in 2010 (Home Office 
2010: Table A). 
 
2. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) was introduced following 
the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure  (HMSO, 1981) , and provided a 
new framework for regulating police powers. While PACE extended police 
powers, its codes of practice also increased police accountability (Reiner 2000). 
 
 
 
